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In the past, refugee camp security has been examined in many lights; however,
the demographic make-up of camps has not been focused on. In this article,
I present a quantitative model that examines attacks on refugee camps. I argue
that the likelihood of an attack on a camp is affected by the demographic
make-up of the camp. The primary demographic causes that affect vulnerability
are the level of male population of the camp, age of camp residents, and the size
of the camp. With the available data, I find that these demographic indicators
are significant in determining the likelihood of an attack. Assessing what char-
acteristics of camps and their populations increase the likelihood of an attack
should serve as a guide to the implementation and organization of new refugee
camps to ensure peace and stability for an already fragile community.
Keywords: refugees, camps, militarization, security
Introduction
Refugee flows occur because ‘the basic bond between citizen and government
has been broken’ (Stein 1986: 269). Historically, refugees are typically from
rural areas and flee to neighbouring low-income states, creating a financial
burden on the host state (Ferris 1985; Stein 1986; Gorman 1987). The out-
come is a prevalence of refugee camps where host states are responsible for
providing physical security for the refugees. One problem, however, is that
host states are not always willing to provide adequate security or capable of
doing so (UNSC 1998; Achvarina and Reich 2006), making the refugee camp
vulnerable to attack. As of 2006, there were about 10 million refugees and
13 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world; in Africa alone
there were 3.1 million refugees (African Development Bank 2009). These
numbers highlight the magnitude of the refugee crisis and the importance
of providing security to an endangered population.
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Despite refugee camps largely being provided with less than adequate se-
curity, not all camps suffer from attacks. This article examines the behaviour
of armed groups and the vulnerability of refugee camps. The previous quali-
tative and case study literature provides explanations linked to politics, eth-
nicity, and security as factors linked to refugee camp militarization. This
article focuses instead on the demographic make-up of camps. The theory
developed is based on lateral pressure theory, developed by Choucri and
North (1975), which argues that if a state is lacking the necessary resources
to support the population, governments will be pressured to take actions
beyond their borders, which may lead to conflict with other states. Moving
beyond the lateral pressure theory, the hypotheses are constructed using an
opportunity and willingness framework similar to Most and Starr (1989) and
Siverson and Starr (1991). The theory and framework are adapted from state
behaviour to apply to sub-state actors.
Building on the arguments of Weinstein (2007), I show that the expected
behaviour of rebel groups suffering from lateral pressure is applicable to
other types of armed groups. I argue that armed groups attack refugee
camps due to lateral pressure caused by a lack of material and/or natural
resources in their area of origin, which are necessary for survival. To survive,
armed groups need access to arms and ammunition, new recruits, and ma-
terial resources to provide food and finances for the members (Weinstein
2005, 2007). Armed groups achieve their needs through patronage from
third parties, cooperation with civilian populations, conflict with civilian
populations, and using available natural resources (Weinstein 2007).
Groups using coercive tactics against civilians may soon find themselves
lacking a population to exploit, due to flight of the civilians. When civilians
flee, one alternative is for armed groups to attack refugee camps that the
civilians fled to.
Refugee camps are attractive targets because aid organizations provide
camps with food and other goods, while host states are not always willing
or able to provide adequate security (UNSC 1998; Achvarina and Reich
2006). In addition, refugee camps are typically located in poor rural areas
far from the host country’s capital (Gorman 1987). The result is refugee
camps in possession of desirable goods, but without the means to protect
them. This combination makes refugee camps attractive targets for armed
groups seeking to increase their capabilities. However, not all refugee
camps are equally vulnerable.
To determine the vulnerability of refugee camps I use an opportunity and
willingness framework to argue the demographic make-up of camps directly
relates to the likelihood of an attack. As demographics within the camps
shift, so does the expected payoff of armed groups due to increasing or
decreasing costs. To test my arguments statistically, I use three demographic
indicators of camps as proxies for vulnerability: gender distribution, age dis-
tribution, and population size. I find that gender, age, and population are
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significant factors in predicting attacks on refugee camps under varying cir-
cumstances in host and home states of refugees.
The study is a significant contribution to the refugee camp security litera-
ture for several reasons. First, although the argument that more vulnerable
refugee camps are more likely to face attacks is not groundbreaking, the
measurement of vulnerability through demographics is unique. Further,
I am applying political science theory to refugee security, in line with sug-
gestions by Black (2001), in order to make generalizable arguments applicable
not only to armed groups, but also to militarized refugees and internally
displaced populations. In addition, lateral pressure theory could be used to
explain refugee flows in the future. Lastly, the article highlights the necessity
for additional collection and distribution of data related to characteristics
of individual refugees and refugee camps in order to make specific policy
recommendations concerning refugee security.
The next section defines key terms in order to clarify the arguments further
on. The definitions are followed by a review of the relevant refugee literature,
focusing on the origins of armed groups and refugee camp security. I then
present my lateral pressure theory, followed by the opportunity and willing-
ness framework, in order to set up the research design and empirical test.
The article closes with a discussion of the implications of the findings and
extensions to pursue in the future.
Defining ‘Refugee Camp Militarization’, ‘Resources’, and ‘Security’
This article argues a theory of refugee camp militarization based on the
necessities that people have for resources and security. However, these
terms need clarification as they often have different meanings under different
circumstances. First, ‘militarized refugees’ and ‘refugee camp militarization’
are two different phenomena. Second, ‘resources’ can come in various forms,
such as natural or material. Third, the provision of security by the state
or international aid organizations can occur under different circumstances.
The importance of these terms requires specific definitions for their use in this
article.
Militarization
Within the literature are conflicting definitions for what constitutes a militar-
ized refugee camp. The lack of a clear definition suggests that researchers
may not be using consistent criteria to classify or differentiate militarized
refugees versus militarized refugee camps (see Muggah and Mogire 2006).
Muggah and Mogire (2006) put forth a clear separation between the types
of militarization. Refugee camp militarization refers to attacks on the camps
or the presence of armed elements that are not refugees (including forced
recruitment), while militarized refugees refers to the refugees of the camps
openly taking up arms. However, the current authority on refugee camp
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security, the Ford Institute, refers to refugee camp militarization as the pres-
ence of armed groups inside the camps. Due to conflicting terminology
and my focus on attacks on camps, I use the term ‘armed attacks’ to refer
to attempts by outside forces to militarize camps through attack or forced
recruitment and ‘refugee militarization’ or ‘militarized refugees’ to refer to
refugees taking up arms.
Resources
The differentiation between material and natural resources is important be-
cause civilians, refugees, and armed groups need access to one or the other or
both. I define ‘material resources’ as finished goods that can be provided to
civilian populations by aid groups or governments. These items could be
food, medicine, mechanical equipment, etc. (Jacobsen 2002). Thus, if armed
groups are attacking refugee camps for economic benefits, it is because the
armed groups wish to take the material resources refugees and aid groups
may possess.
On the other hand, natural resources have multiple categories. Some nat-
ural resources are directly usable by civilians or refugees, which include crop-
land, fresh water, forests, and fisheries. Other natural resources are available
for use by highly organized groups or the state, such as gemstones, precious
metals, and oil (Homer-Dixon 1994; Ross 2004; Urdal 2005; Weinstein 2007).
Income from the natural resources the state benefits from can be used to
provide material resources to civilians living in areas that may be lacking
natural resources. Lastly, there are natural resources that are lootable,
which are defined as ‘lucrative, easy-to-transport resources’, such as alluvial
diamonds and tropical timber (Snyder 2006: 943-4). Organized groups can
take advantage of lootable resources in order to fund their activities.
Security
While ‘security’ is traditionally discussed in terms of states using their mili-
taries to protect territory, there has been a shift to the concept of ‘human
security’ by the United Nations. Human security is a broad term that encom-
passes many subcategories of security, including economic, food, health, en-
vironmental, personal, community, and political (UNDP 1994). However,
refugee camps present a unique situation: host governments and aid groups
share the responsibility for the provision of security and material assistance
(Pitterman 1985). Often the host state is unable or unwilling to provide ad-
equate physical security for refugee camps (UNSC 1998; Achvarina and
Reich 2006), whereas aid organizations typically provide care and assistance,
as opposed to physical security, to refugees (Pitterman 1985). Despite differ-
ing types of security and responsibility, the primary concern regarding secur-
ity in this paper is the physical threat of attack that refugees face.
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Literature Review
A wide range of refugee literature exists; for this paper, two subcategories are
brought together to lay the groundwork for my theoretical contribution.
First, I examine the existing literature on refugee camp security. This litera-
ture shows why refugee camps are vulnerable targets for attacks by armed
groups. Second, I draw on the literature examining the behaviour of armed
groups. Differing motivations of armed groups may lead to different expect-
ations about attacks on refugee camps.
Refugee Camp Security
Reducing vulnerability at refugee camps is important because the causes of
refugee flows are rarely short term and the three ‘durable solutions’, resettle-
ment, integration, and repatriation (Stein 1986; Gorman 1987; Crisp 2003),
have become more difficult to accomplish over time. Voluntary repatriation is
the ideal solution for refugees and host states, while refugee resettlement in
third countries or integration into host communities can reduce the financial
cost for host states and provide greater stability for the refugees than camps.
However, resettlement and integration have become less popular over time, as
states began to view refugees as economic and environmental burdens, as well
as potential security threats (Rogge 1981; Stein 1986; Mandel 1997; Barnett
2002; Adamson 2006). In addition, during the post-Cold War era, major
powers no longer view refugees as pawns to be used strategically and they
are less welcome in rich and powerful states. The result has been a shift in
UNHCR operations from promoting asylum to conducting large-scale hu-
manitarian operations to prevent refugee flows or regionally containing them
(Hammerstad 2000). The lack of opportunity for resettlement and integra-
tion, and the illegality of forced repatriation (though it occasionally occurs),
result in large numbers of ‘protracted refugees’, who have lived in camps for
over five years with no immediate expectation of a durable solution occurring
(Stein 1986; Crisp 2003: 114). Because many refugees live in camps for long
periods, their physical security is an important topic.
The UNHCR guidelines for refugee camp security promote three different
levels of security: soft, medium, and hard, which have become known as the
‘Ladder of Options’ (1999). Physical security is necessary to prevent external
attacks, as well as internal conflicts and refugee militarization. While it is the
host state’s responsibility to provide physical security for refugee camps
(UNHCR 2000), many are not willing or able to take on the responsibility
(UNSC 1998; Stedman 2003; Achvarina and Reich 2006). The current lack of
security makes women and children vulnerable to banditry and men fearful of
forced recruitment (UNHCR 1999). Thus, the ‘medium’ and ‘hard’ options
involve the deployment of police forces or military by the international com-
munity, as opposed to the host state; however, these options are extremely
expensive. Beyond UNHCR providing physical security to ensure safety,
the Ladder of Options illustrates ways refugees and aid groups can take
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preventative actions in a ‘soft’ manner to enhance security in the lower two
rungs, such as social cohesion and camp location/size.
Social cohesion inside and outside a camp can help provide stability and
security. One way to create cohesion within camps is for the refugees to elect
leaders and representatives to promote the humanitarian aspects of the camp
(UNHCR 1999). However, the elected leaders should remain symbolic, leav-
ing the distribution of material resources to humanitarian agencies to prevent
corruption (UNHCR 1999; Lischer 2005). To produce social cohesion outside
the camp between refugees and host communities, Martin (2005) believes
increasing the interaction between, and education of, refugees and host com-
munities can construct relationships between the groups that are cooperative
rather than conflictual. Despite the possibilities, the overall lack of host states
providing physical security could nullify the effectiveness of these options.
However, the social options could be more effective if combined with other
preventative factors to increase both physical and human security.
The primary preventative factors taken to increase refugee camp security
are size and location (UNHCR 1999). UNHCR (1999) prescribes that the
maximum size of a refugee camp should be 20,000 residents; however, many
are larger than recommended. This provision’s intent is to help reduce armed
attacks against camps and the militarization of refugees within the camp by
having a manageable number of refugees. Along with the overall size, the
camps should be located at a ‘reasonable’ distance from the border (Metcalfe
1970; UNHCR 1999: 3; Carik 2008), the intention being that armed attacks
by outside forces will be more difficult and militarized refugees will find it
harder to conduct cross-border raids. However, a minimum distance of
camps being located 50 km from the border does not seem to deter attacks
(Reich 2008). This may be because the armed groups attacking the camps are
local. Overall, the ‘Ladder of Options’ put forward by UNHCR is a good
start if these options are actually implemented in the field. However, as the
report notes (UNHCR 2000), if the host state does not provide protection
security achieved through third party providers is extremely costly. Thus,
other possibilities for producing camp stability need to be taken into account.
Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps
In general, armed attacks on refugee camps occur for one or more of four
reasons: environmental conflict, looting, forced recruitment, and politicide
or genocide (Mtango 1989; Blavo 1999; Tu¨rk 2003). Depending on the type
of armed group—angry local citizens, rebels participating in a civil war
or simple bandits—the goals and level of violence of the attack can vary
(Mtango 1989). Though the type of group attacking and their goals may
vary, the underlying motivations are linked to natural or material resource
allocation among the different types of groups.
Competition between the local residents and the refugees over access to
natural resources can lead to ‘environmental conflict’ (Blavo 1999; Goldstone
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2001; Jacobsen 2002). When refugees come into an area, they begin using
local natural resources. If there are not sufficient natural resources in the area
or material resources being provided to support the influx of refugees, dis-
putes may arise between refugees and local residents (Goldstone 2001).
Refugees can be viewed as ‘exceptional resource users’ compared to the
local population (WCED 1987). When it comes to using natural resources,
the local population is risk averse because they have a longer time horizon
(i.e. they have longer history of living in that area). In contrast, refugees
consider themselves temporary residents and are in dire straits. Therefore,
refugees are risk acceptant when it comes to using large amounts of natural
resources. For example, when there is a limited supply of water or firewood,
refugees do not necessarily conserve usage, leading to increased instability for
the local population and the possibility of environmental conflict.
However, other scholars argue that resource scarcity is not sufficient on its
own to cause conflict between refugees and a local population (Black 1998;
Lischer 2005; Martin 2005; African Development Bank 2009). Martin (2005)
moves beyond the previous scarcity arguments to posit that elites socially
construct environmental conflicts between the host communities and refugees
in order to manipulate local political outcomes. Those who control the dis-
tribution of resources possess the greatest amounts of power. This argument
also applies within the refugee camps; leaders controlling the distribution of
resources can manipulate activity within a camp (Lischer 2005). Thus, envir-
onmental conflict can lead to violence when there is a perceived lack of
natural resources and group leaders find it advantageous to manipulate the
situation. If this manipulation occurs, then in many ways these attacks are
not much different from looting.
Armed groups attack and loot camps for material resources when they do
not have sufficient economic endowments to accomplish their goals (Jacobsen
2002; see Weinstein 2007). For bandits, the goal of looting may be to increase
their personal wealth or to provide for their own group outside of the refugee
camps. For rebels, looting provides material resources, such as food or goods
tradable for arms or ammunition. Without looting, whether it is from
civilians or refugee camps, many groups find it much harder to survive. On
the other hand, rebel groups economically endowed by third-party financiers
or natural resource-rich environments, do not need to use coercive tactics
against civilian populations to survive, but are also not reliant on cooperative
interactions for survival (Weinstein 2007). Thus, in the case of wealthy
groups, the use of coercive tactics against civilians and refugees is for other
reasons, such as forced recruitment, politicide, or genocide.
Forced recruitment occurs because armed groups need additional labour in
order to pursue their objectives. Often, forced recruitment involves removing
children from refugee camps (Achvarina and Reich 2006; Alfredson 2002).
Achvarina and Reich (2006) argue that the number of child soldiers in armed
groups is a direct result of vulnerable refugee camps. In other cases, host
governments look the other way as rebel groups from other states recruit
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large numbers of refugees to go home and fight (Stedman 2003; Milner 2005).
For example, in 2000, government forces allowed Liberians to recruit forcibly
from camps in Guinea (Milner 2005). Alternatively, armed groups may infil-
trate refugee camps to recruit new fighters without force, by promising bene-
fits in the future (Achvarina and Reich 2006). The possibility of subtle
recruiting leads to an overall underestimation of the number of incidents of
recruitment from refugee camps; however, subtle recruitment does not involve
an attack on a camp.
Though looting and forced recruitment have basic motivations relating to
gaining resources, the motivations for attacks on a refugee camp to commit
politicide or genocide are complicated. In politicide, the targets are chosen
due to their political ideology, status in the political hierarchy, or role in
the political opposition to the group in power (Harff and Gurr 1988). In
genocide, the targets are chosen based on ethnicity, religion, or nationality
(Harff and Gurr 1988). The difference between genocide and politicide, then,
is the way perpetrators identify the targets; however, their primary means to
achieve goals, mass killings, are the same (Fein 1993; Harff and Gurr 1988).
A similar motive is to instil enough fear into the refugees that they will
choose to remain in camps in protracted situations, even after a conflict
ends. The Janjaweed militias in Sudan are a current example of armed
groups attacking refugee camps for politicide/genocide. The Janjaweed re-
ceive direct support from the Sudanese government, making them an eco-
nomically endowed armed group, which means they can pursue their goals
without regard for the opinion of civilians (see Weinstein 2007).
The review of the motivations for armed attacks on refugee camps explains
the goals of armed groups, but does not detail the underlying motives of
lateral pressure. Armed groups take action against refugee camps because
of an overall lack of natural and material resources necessary for survival.
In order to gain material resources, armed groups can attack refugee camps.
I argue the decision-making process relates to the perceived vulnerability of
the refugee camps. Armed groups want to minimize the amount of risk they
are taking to achieve their goals.
Theory of Lateral Pressure
I draw on the theory of lateral pressure to provide a framework for under-
standing the patterns of attacks on refugee camps. Lateral pressure refers to
‘the process of foreign expansion of any activity’ to increase capabilities in
order to provide the population with additional services (Choucri and North
1975: 16). In order for a group’s actions to qualify as lateral pressure, three
aspects of a foreign expansion must be identifiable: the situation motivating
activity beyond borders, the activity beyond borders, and the impact of these
activities on the people of another state and their environment. The three
aspects in my application of the theory are a) natural or material resource
gain, b) attacks on refugee camps, and c) the impact of attacks on the
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refugees. While I directly discuss the situation motivating armed groups to
move outside their borders, building on the arguments of Weinstein (2007), I
only test the activities of armed groups (attacks on refugee camps) beyond
their borders using the opportunity and willingness framework. Though only
the second step is necessary for testing, the first step shows how the test does
not require information on which type of armed group attacked the refugee
camp, thus making the theory more generalizable.
Originally developed as an explanation of state behaviour in the interna-
tional system, the theory of lateral pressure is applicable to sub-state group
behaviour. Sub-state groups, as well as states, require material and/or natural
resources in order to support their populations; however, the population of
sub-state groups is much smaller. When groups do not produce or receive the
necessary resources for survival, they must move beyond the borders of their
traditional area of operation, whether it is a town, region, or country.
However, when moving beyond their ‘borders’ seeking to gain capabilities,
groups may cross the ‘borders’ of other groups. When groups cross each
other’s paths, the opportunity for interaction occurs and can be cooperative
(trade) or conflictual (armed violence). I focus on conflictual interactions
between armed groups and refugees housed in camps.
Due to the focus on interaction between armed groups and refugee camps,
and there being different types of armed groups, a discussion of armed group
behaviour is necessary. Based on the work of Weinstein (2007), I expand the
argument to other types of armed groups, whether they are angry local citi-
zens, international or domestic rebels, bandits,1 or refugees. Depending on
the type of armed group, the possible goals differ. Local groups (angry citi-
zens, bandits, or rebels) have five typical goals: response to environmental
conflict, looting, forced recruitment, politicide or genocide. International
groups (bandits or rebels) have four typical goals: looting, forced recruitment,
politicide, or genocide. Refugees staging attacks on refugee camps have one
typical goal: looting. Though the groups are inherently different, I argue,
using Weinstein’s theory, that motivations of the over-lapping goals are simi-
lar across groups and relate to the distribution of material and natural re-
sources. In addition, I discuss the general expected payoffs and timelines of
the goals. Because I show the similar expectations in the motivations for an
attack, the internal structure of armed groups, such as the specific goal and
type of armed groups, does not need to be known for this project.
Thus far, I have identified five goals of armed groups’ attacks on refugee
camps: response to environmental conflict, looting, forced recruitment, poli-
ticide, and genocide. All of these goals allow armed groups to gain capabil-
ities they perceive as necessary to survive and have direct and indirect
underlying motivations. The direct motivation behind environmental conflict
is the perceived lack of available natural resources to share between local
populations and refugees housed in camps. The indirect motivation for attack
is that the government is not providing material resources to local residents
as a substitute for sharing the natural resources in areas around camps.
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An attack due to previous environmental conflict has an immediate, small to
medium sized payoff for the attacking group, depending whether the attack
prevents future refugee use of local natural resources.
For looting, the direct motivation for militarized refugees, local, or inter-
national groups also relates to a lack of resources (material, natural, and
lootable). For militarized refugees, looting occurs due to a perceived lack
of distribution of material resources from aid groups and/or the lack of op-
portunity to pursue economic activities in the host state. For local groups,
looting occurs due to a lack of natural resources for survival, in conjunction
with the government not providing material resources as ‘welfare’. In add-
ition, local groups are not eligible to receive material resources from aid
groups providing for refugee camps. Foreign groups consisting of bandits
or rebels loot because they can no longer survive by taking predatory
action against civilians in their area of origin, possibly because they created
the refugee flow to begin with. In addition, the lack of lootable resources in
their area of origin could push the armed groups across the border seeking
material resources. Looting has an immediate small payoff of whatever
material resources the attacking group can garner.
Forced recruitment is typically done by local or foreign rebel groups
(though government sponsored groups may also recruit forcibly). For both
types of groups, forced recruitment is necessary because their economic en-
dowments do not allow for recruitment through the use of promised pay-
ment. Beyond not possessing the ability to pay voluntary recruits, groups
recruiting forcibly are not able to use an ‘activist’ strategy to encourage vol-
untary recruitment with a long-term payoff (Weinstein 2007). On the other
hand, economically endowed rebels may forcibly recruit, but do not have to,
thus they may not accept the reputation cost of attacking refugee camps.
Groups that have to recruit forcibly will most likely be motivated by the
opportunity to loot. The payoff from forcibly recruiting refugees does not
occur immediately; armed groups must train these new recruits in order to
generate value for the armed group.
To commit politicide or genocide, foreign groups must be extremely moti-
vated. These groups are acting with the expectation of a future payoff in
material or natural resources in the home state of the refugees they are at-
tacking. Indirectly, the state-sponsored groups engaging in politicide or geno-
cide are taking action to ensure their political or ethnic group retains power
in their home state. Taking these extreme actions helps to reduce future
political competition, based on the assumption their groups will win the
civil conflict occurring in the home state. For groups committing politicide
or genocide the payoff timeline can be large. As stated above, for a payoff to
occur their group needs to win the civil conflict in their home state, otherwise
the armed group may receive nothing. If successful, however, the payoff
could be large and long-term.
Up until this point, I have identified the motivations and payoffs of armed
groups that attack refugee camps, which leaves one question remaining.
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How can refugee camps be made safer from attack? Refugee camps can be
made safer if the cost of an attack is more than the expected payoff for
armed groups. To examine the costs of attacking a refugee camp, I apply
an opportunity and willingness framework to show how shifting demographic
factors can affect the decision-making of armed groups.
Opportunity and Willingness
To test the vulnerability of camps, I employ an opportunity and willingness
framework to show how the demographic make-up within camps affects the
likelihood of attack. Opportunity refers to the macro-level factors affecting
vulnerability, such as geography and camp location. Willingness refers to the
micro-level factors affecting the decision-making process of armed groups,
such as camp demographics and level of physical security. Previously, the
opportunity and willingness framework has been used to investigate interna-
tional war initiation and diffusion (Most and Starr 1989; Siverson and Starr
1990, 1991) and is applicable here because I use the framework to investigate
the diffusion of violence by sub-state actors. The first step is to examine the
opportunity of armed groups; if opportunity exists, the cost and benefits of
attack temper or enhance the willingness level.
Environmental and structural factors determine opportunity at the macro
level. Opportunity is the ‘possibility of interaction’ between actors (Most and
Starr 1989: 30). Interaction between actors must be intellectually, physically,
or technologically possible for opportunity to be present (Siverson and Starr
1990). In my application, the actors are the refugees in camps and the armed
groups attacking the camps. Thus, the opportunity for attack exists if armed
groups have the capability of attacking the refugee camps. Factors such as
how the attacking group travels (e.g. foot, horse, truck) have a direct impact
on the possibility of an armed attack on a camp. In turn, the terrain located
between the camp and areas from which militarizing groups originate affects
the opportunity of interaction, and thus, the vulnerability of the camp.
Willingness refers to the micro-level choices of individuals or groups
(Most and Starr 1989). An armed group’s willingness to attack a refugee
camp is determined by examining the costs and benefits of an attack
(Siverson and Starr 1990), which comes from two sources. First, the benefits
of attacking a refugee camp stem from the goals of the armed group. Second,
willingness is related to the perceived vulnerability of the refugee camp, which
I argue is in part determined by the demographic make-up of the camp.
First, the benefits to an outside armed group attacking a refugee camp
directly relate to the goals driving the armed group to take action. If the
focus is economic via looting, then the refugee camps must possess enough
material resources to plunder to offset the physical and economic cost of an
attack. If the goal is forced recruitment, then there needs to be appropriate
types of refugees to conscript (e.g. not too young or too old). If the end goal
is politicide or genocide, then merely killing refugees provides the benefit.
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However, the goal of an attack may not come from any single issue, but a
combination of these reasons. For any of the goals listed above, the cost of
an attack also plays a role in decision-making.
Second, the vulnerability of the refugee camp greatly affects the cost
of attack. A camp with efficient protection increases the cost of attack be-
cause there is increased resistance against an attacking force. Similarly, the
costs associated with attack decrease when a camp is protected by a small
or unmotivated force. At the extreme, when the host government supports
the attacking group, the costs greatly decrease; this occurred in 2000 when
Liberian forces forcibly recruited from refugee camps in Guinea with
Guinean governmental approval (Milner 2005). However, it is common
knowledge in the aid community that refugee camps often do not receive
adequate physical security from host states (UNSC 1998; Achvarina and
Reich 2006). Thus, I examine other demographic factors that affect the vul-
nerability of refugee camps.
Hypotheses
To develop a comprehensive model determining the vulnerability of refugee
camps, the model must account for factors affecting both opportunity and
willingness of the groups suffering from the forces of lateral pressure.
However, the available data on individual refugee camps prevents the testing
of opportunity factors affecting the decision-making process. Therefore, this
study focuses exclusively on willingness factors that affect the vulnerability of
a refugee camp to attack.2
A camp’s vulnerability affects the degree to which the camp is an attractive
target for armed groups to attack. The more vulnerable a refugee camp, the
more likely it is to be attacked: when a camp is vulnerable, the willingness of
armed groups to attack the camp increases because the cost is low. Therefore,
in order to determine the likelihood of an attack, I need to measure camp
vulnerability. One way to do so is to look at the demographic make-up of the
camps. For example, refugee camps with a high percentage of male residents
should be subject to lower probabilities of attack. Here, the logic is that male
refugees are more likely to take up arms than female refugees (Lischer 2005),
which, in turn, decreases the camp’s overall vulnerability. Hence, the higher
proportion of males within the camp tempers the willingness of outside
groups to an attack a camp due to a cost increase.
Hypothesis 1: The higher the proportion of males residing in a camp, the lower the
likelihood of an attack on the camp.3
In addition to the gender distribution of the camp, the age distribution also
plays an important role in vulnerability. A concentration of younger individ-
uals creates a prime target for armed groups seeking to recruit new members
forcibly (Reich 2008). In addition, camps with more young refugees are in-
creasingly vulnerable to attack due to a potential lack of an adult population
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for adequate defence. The low cost from the potential easiness of victory,
due to the high vulnerability of children, increases the willingness for attacks
on camps.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of young refugees, the higher the likelihood
of an attack on the camp.
Finally, the overall size of the camps is a factor of vulnerability that may
lead to attack by outside groups (UNHCR 1999; Reich 2008). Intuitively, as
camps become larger, they should become less vulnerable, if we assume that
larger camps have larger security forces. However, in reality host states are
often unable or unwilling to provide adequate physical security for refugee
camps (UNSC 1998; Achvarina and Reich 2006). Thus, as camps increase in
size the security force assigned for protection may remain the same, causing a
lower refugee–security ratio. The lack of adequate camp security, combined
with the larger size of camps, increases the vulnerability of refugees, which
means larger camps should be more prone to attack. There are higher levels
of material resources to loot and proportionally fewer security guards to
protect the material resources.
Hypothesis 3: The larger the camp, the greater the likelihood of an attack.
Alternative Hypotheses
While I argue demographic factors affect the vulnerability of refugee camps,
other alternative hypotheses can be drawn from previous literature. Drawing
from the work of Weinstein (2005, 2007), Humphreys (2005), and Humphreys
and Weinstein (2006) relating to rebel groups and civilian treatment, I put
forth two alternative hypotheses that relate to refugee camp vulnerability.
The first is ongoing conflict in the host state where the camp is located or
the home state the refugees fled. The logic is that the presence of conflict in
either state means there are armed groups in need of material resources or
combatants; refugee camps possess both. If no conflict is occurring in the
host state, the government may be willing to assign additional physical se-
curity to camps in order to enhance stability. If no conflict is occurring in the
home state of refugees, the need for armed groups to move beyond their
borders decreases.
Alternative Hypothesis 1: Ongoing conflict in the host or home state will increase
the likelihood of an attack on a refugee camp.
Second, armed groups have alternative options for funding if the host or
home state possesses lootable resources. Weinstein (2007) argues rebel
groups with access to lootable resources are economically endowed, which
means they can use indiscriminate violence against civilians. For refugee
camps, the implication is that if local armed groups attack camps, the
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motivation is unlikely to be resource gain. Across the border, if the home
state of the refugees possesses lootable resources, armed groups may not want
to exert the effort to engage in cross-border action, with the exception being
for the purpose of politicide or genocide. However, it can be difficult to
determine where the armed group that attacks a refugee camp originates.
Alternative Hypothesis 2a: The presence of lootable resources in the HOST state
will increase the likelihood of an attack on a refugee camp.
Alternative Hypothesis 2b: The presence of lootable resources in the HOME state
will decrease the likelihood of an attack on a refugee camp.
Data and Test
To test the hypotheses, I use a binomial logit. Due to the limited nature
of the data and time restrictions for hand coding, I limit the scope to the
African continent. I focus on Africa because it has the highest levels of armed
attacks on camps in the world (Muggah and Mogire 2006). I collect data for
the dependent variable on the occurrence of armed attacks on refugee camps
using media content analysis. For the independent variables, I use camp level
data from UNHCR (2008).
The dependent variable is armed attacks on refugee camps between 2006
and 2008. I determine the occurrence of an armed attack by doing media
content analyses. The primary, though not the only, sources for the analysis
are UNHCR, Reuters, and the Associated Press. Previous research shows
that examination of media sources is appropriate to determine the occurrence
of an event (Achvarina and Reich 2006; Eck and Hultman 2007; Gartner
2004). Each source was read to determine if any of the refugee camp mili-
tarization (armed attack) classifications put forth by Muggah and Mogire
(2006) are present (i.e. armed violence in camps, political activism and vio-
lence, storage and trafficking of small arms, military training and recruit-
ment, infiltration of armed elements, use of relief/development resources).
If any of the characteristics are present, I code the case as ‘1’; those camps
with no reports of attack are coded as ‘0’. I drop refugee camps returning
zero results in the content analysis. Out of 198 camps, 98 camps are included
in the dataset over the course of three years, resulting in an N of 220. I find
that an attack or forced recruitment occurred in 9.5 per cent of refugee camps
in Africa.
The UNHCR statistical database provides the data for the main independ-
ent variables. The database provides camp level demographic data between
2006 and 2008, which includes population, age, and gender breakdowns.
Though armed groups that attack refugee camps will not know the exact
demographics, they should have an idea of the general make-up of the
camp. Four independent variables are included in the model: percentage of
male refugees, the percentage of the camp between the ages of 5 and 11, the
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percentage of the camp between the ages of 12 and 17, and the log of the
population. I use two age groups to model the relationship between age and
perceived vulnerability. I include the selection of ages 5 to 11 because, at that
age, children are capable of acting on their own without as much reliance on
adults to take actions such as running and hiding. The group is separate from
the 12 to 17 age group due to the older refugee children being capable par-
ticipants in the defence of the refugee camp, but also being of a desirable age
for forced recruitment.
To model the two alternative hypotheses, I include two control variables in
each model. The first set is the presence of conflict in the host state and the
home state of the refugees according to the Geneva Declaration Secretariat’s
(2008) report. The second set is the presence of lootable resources (tropical
timber or alluvial diamonds, as classified by Snyder 2006) in the host state
and the home state of the refugees. A single interaction model cannot be used
because states suffering from conflict do not possess lootable resources in the
time period examined. However, the combination of conflict and lootable
resources witnessed in the time period studied is historically unrepresentative
(see Weinstein 2007). Table 1 presents the summary statistics.
Results
For both models, the results of the binary logit support the use of demo-
graphic indicators as predictors of vulnerability and overall refugee camp
security. For each model, I will go through the results in relation to the
hypotheses put forth. In order to put the results in a more interpretable
context, I then present graphs showing the predicted probability of an
attack on a refugee camp, while varying the levels of significant demographic
characteristics of the camps. These findings highlight the importance of con-
sidering refugee camp demographics in order to enhance security. In addition,
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (Median) Standard Deviation
Percentage Male 48.972 5.911
Percentage 5-11 21.936 6.736
Percentage 12-17 15.655 4.992
Population (Logged) 9.046 1.229
Population 15057 16209
Host Conflict (1)
Home Conflict (1)
Lootable Resources, Host (0)
Lootable Resources, Home (0)
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the significance of demographic variables shows that additional data collec-
tion is necessary to investigate the issue further.
Conflict Control Model
Table 2 presents the results of the binary logit on the effect of demographic
characteristics on the likelihood of an armed attack using the conflict control
variables. The results show the gender variable is statistically significant with
a coefficient of 0.203, supporting Hypothesis 1. In addition, the age 12–17
variable is statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.283. However, the
age variables sign is in the opposite direction than Hypothesis 2 predicts. The
implication is that as the population of refugees between the ages of 12 and
17 increases, there is a decrease in the likelihood of an attack on a camp. The
results for Hypothesis 2 for ages 12 to 17 suggest that this group of refugees
possesses some level of deterrence for armed groups. Hypothesis 3, the size
of population of refugee camps, does not receive support in this model.
The alternative hypothesis of conflict does not receive support either.4 The
presence of conflict is not a significant predictor of an attack when demo-
graphic factors are entered into the model.
Figure 1 helps us visualize the significant demographic variables in the
model controlling for conflict in the host or home state. The graph varying
the percentage of males within a refugee camp shows that as the level of
males increases, the predicted probability of attack decreases, as do the 95 per
cent confidence intervals. This result supports Hypothesis 1, where the like-
lihood of an attack moves drastically towards zero after the percentage male
crosses 55 per cent. The graph visualizing varying levels of teenage refugees in
a camp does not correspond with Hypothesis 2, as stated above; however, the
variable is significant. The second graph shows that as the level of 12 to
Table 2
Binary Logit Results of Refugee Camp Demographics Effect on Armed Attacks
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error
Percentage Male 0.203* 0.102
Percentage 5–11 0.016 0.053
Percentage 12–17 0.283* 0.127
Population (Logged) 0.136 0.292
Conflict (Host) 0.237 0.821
Conflict (Home) 0.965 0.943
Pseudo-Log Likelihood¼49.446.
Pseudo R2¼ 0.190.
N¼ 206.
*¼ p-value50.05.
#¼ p-value50.10.
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17 year-olds increases, the probability of an attack decreases. The likelihood
bottoms out and remains constant, with small confidence intervals, as the
percentage of teenagers passes 20 per cent. The predicted probabilities for the
lootable resources model produce similar results, but I discuss it separately
because the two models coefficients are not directly comparable.
Lootable Resources Control Model
Table 3 presents the results of another binomial logit using the presence of
lootable resources as the alternative hypothesis. The gender variable, for
Hypothesis 1, has a p-value of 0.06, making it marginally statistically signifi-
cant with a coefficient 0.261. An increase in the levels of males in refugee
camps decreases the likelihood of an attack. The age 12–17 is statistically
significant with a coefficient of 0.218, but consistent with the previous
model, the significant age variable’s sign is in the opposite direction than
Hypothesis 2 predicts. Hypothesis 3 receives support with the logged popu-
lation variable having a coefficient of 0.608. The alternative hypothesis
Figure 1
Predicted Probabilities of an Attack on Refugee Camps: Varying
Demographics
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receives support from both control variables, indicating that the presence of
lootable resources in the host and home countries affects the likelihood of an
attack, with coefficients of 4.465 and 3.167, respectively. Though the pres-
ence of lootable resources is statistically significant in the model, the substan-
tive significance of these variables is not as powerful as the main independent
variables.
Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities, with 95 per cent confidence
intervals, of an attack on a refugee camp when varying the significant demo-
graphic variables. The first graph visualizing Hypothesis 1, varying the per-
centage of males in the refugee camp, shows that as the male population of a
camp increases, the likelihood of an attack decreases. In addition, the 95 per
cent confidence interval drastically shrinks and remains somewhat constant
after the percentage of males within the camp increases past 50 per cent. The
percentage of teenagers within a camp produces an interesting result, which
does not support Hypothesis 2, as stated. As the percentage of refugees aged
12–17 increases, the likelihood of attack decreases quickly, along with the
confidence intervals. However, after the percentage passes 20 per cent, the
likelihood of an attack begin to increase, albeit slightly, while the confidence
intervals enlarge. The third graph visualizes Hypothesis 3, showing that as
population increases, so does the likelihood of an attack, which is consistent
with the literature (UNHCR 1999; Reich 2008). However, over the range of
refugee camp size, the probability of an attack does not drastically increase,
suggesting the UNHCR recommendation for camp size may not be as im-
portant as thought. The graphs presented for both models show that shifting
the demographics in refugee camps can lower the probability of an attack.
Overall, the results support the argument that varying the demographic
makeup of refugee camps can reduce the likelihood of an attack. At a
Table 3
Binary Logit Results of Refugee Camp Demographics Effect on Armed Attacks
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard
Error
Percentage Male 0.261** 0.141
Percentage 5–11 0.018 0.077
Percentage 12–17 0.218* 0.110
Population (Logged) 0.608* 0.195
Lootable Resources (Host) 4.465* 0.571
Lootable Resources (Home) 3.167* 0.601
Pseudo-Log Likelihood¼40.933.
Pseudo R2¼ 0.330.
N¼ 206.
*¼ p-value50.05.
#¼ p-value50.10.
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minimum, the findings should encourage additional research and data collec-
tion on camp level characteristics. In addition, collection of more detailed
data on armed attacks on camps could allow for more specific theories and
findings. In the next section, I discuss the implications of the results in more
detail and identify the types of data that need collection.
Discussion
The results of both tests indicate the demographic profile of refugee camps
needs to be taken into account in relation to refugee camp security. One
option is to conduct demographic engineering to create safer camps. The
Figure 2
Predicted Probabilities of an Attack on Refugee Camps: Varying
Demographics
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distribution of refugees to various camps can take place at transfer centres
near the borders in order to make up well-balanced camps. I am not sug-
gesting adjusting the demographic profile of camps will be easy, but rather
that it should be done to the best of the ability of those involved in order to
create an environment where refugees are less vulnerable. Any steps that can
be taken to promote refugee security should be taken, especially since host
states are not providing adequate physical security in most cases. When
compared to the physical cost of guarding camps, adjusting demographics
may be less expensive than private security while allowing aid groups to
remain neutral.
Alternatives to demographic engineering exist in those countries where the
government is willing to provide security, but does not possess proper fund-
ing. One option is to use demographic analysis to determine the ideal assign-
ment of scare security forces. Efficient assignment of effective security forces
can reduce the willingness of armed groups to attack refugee camps. In add-
ition, if the allocation of limited security resources is successful, other host
governments may be willing to follow suit and begin providing security for
refugee camps. For the time being, refugee camps remain vulnerable and
should be a focus for researchers seeking to minimize refugee vulnerability
in any way possible. In other words, no uniform policy options exist for all
refugee camps, the involvement of the host state in the security process will
dictate what actions can be taken to reduce refugee vulnerability; however,
the full impact of demographics on vulnerability requires additional data
collection.
The focus on vulnerability, through the willingness of armed groups,
though, is not complete. Additional factors for which data are not easily
available exist. First, the origin of the refugees may matter to the armed
groups attacking the camps, depending on their goals. Camps of state-in-exile
refugees may not be a desirable target to groups seeking material resources
due to the organization of the refugees (see Lischer 2003), but could be a
desirable target to groups whose goal is politicide or genocide. Second, the
level of security present at the camp can affect the willingness of armed
groups. Despite knowing that by-and-large refugee camps lack physical secur-
ity provided by host states, additional knowledge can be gained from categor-
izing the level of security at various camps. Any additional data on camp level
characteristics will help to model fully the vulnerability of refugee camps, since
host governments are unlikely to increase physical security funding.
Beyond the willingness factors tested in this paper, a complete model of
camp vulnerability requires the inclusion of opportunity factors. The incorp-
oration of opportunity factors is important because a primary way of low-
ering willingness is to reduce the opportunity for attacks to take place. The
distance of the refugee camp from the border directly affects opportunity. A
camp located near the border increases the opportunity for armed attacks
(Reich 2008; UNSC 1998). From the view of outside forces, attacking the
camp is easier the closer the camp is to the border, which may encourage
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attacks due to the ability to gain material resources and an increase in the
perception of vulnerability. Data need to be collected on where exactly camps
are located and the distance of the camps from the border by both road and
direct route over land; currently the Ford Foundation for Human Security
is investigating these factors.
Conclusion
This article presents a preliminary investigation of the determinants of the
vulnerability of refugee camps based on demographics. Using a theory of
lateral pressure with an opportunity and willingness framework, I find the
demographic profile of refugee camps provides some explanation of whether
or not an attack on a camp by an armed group will occur. In particular,
the distribution of males versus females, the level of teenage refugees within
the camp, and the overall population size affect the likelihood of an attack.
Due to the high cost of providing physical security, many host states cannot
or will not provide adequate forces; thus, as the size of the camps increases so
does the likelihood of attack or forced recruitment. However, as the percent-
age of males within the camps increases, the likelihood of an attack or forced
recruitment decreases. In turn, changing the age distribution of refugees
within the camps to a lower level decreases the likelihood of an attack.
These findings suggest that policymakers should take the demographic
make-up of camps into account at transfer centres in order to provide opti-
mal physical security at a reasonable cost, since host countries may not be
willing or able to provide comprehensive security.
In conclusion, refugees facing any type of attack or militarization suffer in
an extremely dangerous situation, which may be relieved with additional re-
search that translates into policy change. Refugees have a right to physical
and human security, but proper funding is often unavailable and is not likely
to be available any time soon. Thus, when refugee camps become necessary,
and organizers are determining camp logistics, they should consider demo-
graphics. For example, a one-time cost of transporting refugees farther away
from the border is likely far less expensive than trying to find funding for
higher levels of physical and human security in a camp close to the border or
repaying sunk costs if a future move is necessary. In the end, correctly under-
standing the causes of attacks on refugee camps is critical to providing
long-term security for this fragile group.
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1. Weinstein (2007) briefly discusses recruitment styles and payment abilities that
result in armed groups being classified as bandits as opposed to rebels.
2. In a later section, I discuss the opportunity factors necessary for a complete study,
along with some additional willingness factors that should be taken into account.
3. Hypothesis 1 highlights the necessity for studying both militarized refugees and
camp militarization. A decrease in the likelihood of one type of militarization may
lead to an increase in the other, which indicates organizers need to take into
account the optimal male population in order to maximize security from forces
inside and out (see Lischer 2005).
4. Alternative models measuring the length of the conflict in the host and/or home
state to show protracted refugee situations did not receive significant results either.
Demographic variables remained the same statistically.
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